




































1 Reconceptualising Freedom in the
21st Century: Degrowth vs.
Neoliberalism
by
Felix Windegger, Clive L. Spash
Institute for Multi-Level Governance & Development
Department of Socio-Economics
Vienna University of Economics and Business
02 / 2021
Reconceptualising Freedom in the 21st Century: Degrowth vs. Neoliberalism
by
Felix Windegger, Clive L. Spash
Abstract
The hegemonic role of neoliberal ideas in today’s political-economic thought and practice has
shaped the common way of thinking about freedom in Western society and more generally in the
international community. This involves a negative, individualistic and market-centred interpretation
of the concept. In contrast, visions of a degrowth society offer a radical alternative based on
Cornelius Castoriadis’ notion of autonomy. This paper outlines how this formulation of freedom can
be conceptualised relative to the predominant neoliberal theory. We present an overview and
contrast of both positions and then follow this up with an empirical study. More specifically, we
probe the extent to which the degrowth movement actually follows the Castoriadian theory of
freedom as opposed to the hegemonic neoliberal conception. Results are reported from a survey
conducted at the 2018 Degrowth Conference in Malmö, Sweden. While survey participants were
found to hold positions consistent with the Castoriadian theory, we also identify problematic and
under-conceptualised aspects in their understanding of freedom. This points to the need for the
degrowth movement to directly address its theoretical foundations, and elaborate on and
strengthen its vision of freedom compatible with a future degrowth society.
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1. Introduction 
While there has been a noticeable increase in publications about degrowth in recent years, the 
topic of freedom is seldom explicitly discussed. For example, while the term does appear at 
various points, there is no dedicated entry on the topic in the 51 chapters of the definitional 
handbook Degrowth: A Vocabulary for a New Era (D'Alisa, Demaria, and Kallis 2014). There 
is a chapter on ‘autonomy’, but the relationship to freedom is not explored and remains 
unclear. The lack of both a definition and a discussion of the potential role of freedom in a 
degrowth context leaves it open to a variety of contradictory interpretations, from Marxist and 
eco-feminist forms defined in terms of removing exploitation to the neoliberal focussed on 
preventing restrictions on individual choice in the market place. The tendency to define 
freedom purely negatively, as the absence of coercion, is in line with the political philosophy 
of liberalism that is hegemonic in Western society. Is there then a distinctive and alternative 
approach offered by degrowth thought as to what constitutes freedom? 
Some explanation is required of why the concept, and its role in a possible social-
ecological transformation, have been neglected in debates about and research on degrowth. 
Perhaps the divergence is too great between the everyday understanding of freedom in 
contemporary capitalist market societies and the implied constraints on ‘free market’ choice 
called for by the degrowth movement, under a ‘voluntary, smooth and equitable transition to a 
regime of lower production and consumption’ (Schneider, Kallis, and Martinez-Alier 2010: 
511). Indeed, the prevalent negative, individualistic and consumerist interpretations of the 
concept of freedom seem to be incompatible with a democratic and redistributive downscaling 
of the biophysical size of the global economy, which is a necessary step on the path towards 
socially just and environmentally sustainable futures according to most degrowth advocates. 
While this might explain why there is a reluctance amongst degrowth advocates to talk about 
freedom, simply ignoring the concept leaves a gap in the argument for a degrowth society. 
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Freedom is an omnipresent issue and deeply intertwined with identity in (neo)liberalised 
Western democracies (Karaba 2016). Thus, any vision of an alternative social and economic 
system that seems to neglect or reduce freedom will likely be casually rejected without any 
due thought by the a considerable amount of Western, as well as Western influenced and 
aspiring, peoples. 
There are two principal ways out of this deadlock. One would be to entirely and 
explicitly abandon the logic of seeking freedom and reject it as a guiding principle. There are 
indeed good reasons to support this position, not least due to the dangers connected to the 
(mis)use of the notion as a mere tool to justify any cause (Fiscella 2015). The other would be 
to critically analyse the predominant understanding of freedom in contemporary market 
societies and reformulate the concept for a degrowth society. This paper seeks to initiate and 
contribute towards undertaking the latter, thereby attempting to bridge the alleged divide 
between degrowth and freedom. 
The endeavour builds on the assumption that the hegemonic role of neoliberal ideas in 
moulding economic, political and social structures and relations has, by definition, strongly 
affected common ideas as to what it means to be free. Neoliberalisation processes have, 
beginning in the late 1970s, shaped the ‘ways of thought and political-economic practices to 
the point where it is now part of the common-sense way we interpret, live in and understand 
the world’ (Harvey 2007: 22; Hay 2004). We start (Section 2.1) by investigating how this 
understanding of freedom was introduced by the works of Friedrich von Hayek (1899-1992) 
and Milton Friedman (1912-2006)1. An alternative and largely unrecognised formulation of 
freedom is then presented (Section 2.2). This is based on the political theory of philosopher, 
economist and psychoanalyst Cornelius Castoriadis (1922-1997). His work can be considered 
1 Both played a decisive role in the Mont Pèlerin Society (MPS), which Mirowski & Plehwe (2009: 
428-429) reveal as the institutional face of the ‘neoliberal thought collective’ which has 
‘conscientiously developed the neoliberal identity for more than sixty years’. Hayek was a founder and 
its first president (1948-1960), while Friedman chaired it between 1970 and 1972. 
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a major theoretical reference for many authors associated with the degrowth movement 
(Asara, Profumi, and Kallis 2013). Having established these two opposing viewpoints on 
freedom, an empirical investigation is reported (Section 3). A structured questionnaire was 
undertaken at the 2018 Degrowth Conference in Malmö in order to test for the presence and 
strength of belief in the two types of freedom amongst those associating themselves with the 
degrowth movement. The findings are then discussed and interpreted (Section 4). This 
provides an exploratory analysis of the extent to which the degrowth movement actually 
follows a radical alternative notion of freedom, as opposed to the hegemonic neoliberal 
conception. 
2. Conceptualising Freedom: Two Opposing Positions 
2.1 The Neoliberal Theory 
While heterogeneity exists, the neoliberal understanding of freedom remains crucially related 
to the work and theories of Hayek and Friedman as the two most influential personalities. 
Hayek, who stands in a tradition close to classic liberalism, provides the most elaborate and 
meticulous theory of freedom within the neoliberal spectrum. His deliberations inspired 
neoliberal scholars and prepared the ground for neoliberal policy (Mirowski and Plehwe 
2009). However, from the 1980s onwards, the second generation of the Chicago School 
dominated debates on the organisation of a neoliberal economy and society. Friedman then 
came to the fore as its most prominent exponent, combining monetarist macroeconomic 
beliefs with a concept of economic liberty. The ideas developed in Hayek’s Constitution of 
Liberty (2011 [1960]) combined with Friedman’s Capitalism and Freedom (2002 [1962]) can 
be taken as providing the foundations for the predominant neoliberal understanding of 
freedom. 
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Central to both Hayek’s and Friedman’s concept of freedom is a strong methodological 
individualism. Freedom is attributed only to an ontologically distinct self whose private 
sphere is to be protected against the coercive intrusion of the external world (i.e., society); 
that is the ‘outside’ as other, and in particular the other as constituted by other individuals and 
the State. Hayek (2011 [1960]: 58) and Friedman (2002 [1962]: 12) conceptualise social 
relations and collectives as, first and foremost, potential sources of coercion. Hayek (2011 
[1960]: 71) defines coercion as the intentional imposition of another person’s will on one’s 
own. Freedom, as its analytical opposite, also takes the form of a relation. It describes a ‘state 
in which a man is not subject to coercion by the arbitrary will of another or others’ (ibid: 58). 
This narrow negative definition, as the absence of—or ‘freedom from’ (Berlin 2007 
[1969])—external coercion, implies that social processes and their effects have no bearing on 
the extent to which a person is free. Freedom is then divorced from the operational outcomes 
of ‘markets’ as instituted processes, despite their consequences for such things as the 
distribution of wealth/poverty and working conditions. Although such social processes and 
their results might heavily restrain individual choice, they cannot, under this approach, be 
considered coercive, as long as they are not intended as such by any human agent.2 If the 
whole of social life is organised through competitive, market-like structures, then everybody 
is assumed to be free to act in accordance with their own wishes and capacities and, thus, to 
be self-responsible. Over an unspecified time, such a society is supposed to produce an 
outcome that gives each person what they ‘deserve’ (i.e., meritocracy). By implication, 
centralised attempts to take action against structural constraints (related to, for instance, class, 
gender or wealth) are deprived of their legitimacy. They are rejected a priori as illegitimate 
encroachment by the State and, hence, as a threat to the paramount value of individual liberty. 
2 For a critical assessment of this well-entrenched and influential (neo)liberal line of argument see 
Haworth (1991). 
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The primary realm of neoliberal freedom is the economy. Both Hayek and Friedman are 
deeply convinced that economic liberty represents not only the single most important 
embodiment of freedom, but also an indispensable condition for all other forms. For example, 
in the context of employment, hiring and workplace regulation to prevent discrimination on 
grounds of race, colour or religion are regarded as deplorable, and such anti-discriminatory 
regulation should, from their point of view, be removed. Accordingly, Friedman (2002 
[1962]: 111) references this as ‘interference with the freedom of individuals to enter into 
voluntary contracts with one another’, while such contracts are taken to be the defining aspect 
of freedom. This primacy of ‘the economic’ justifies the neglect of all other types of freedom, 
such as political liberty and autonomy. Going beyond and partially against Hayek, Friedman 
defines freedom primarily as choice and so essentially economic.3 Only if enough similarly 
valuable alternatives are available, from which an individual can choose, can an individual be 
considered free in their decision (Ibid: 28). Freedom is thus reduced to choice, and choice 
means nothing but the ability to pick from a pre-selected number of alternatives in the 
marketplace (Ibid: 15). The individual’s decision-making process and their formation of 
desires and preferences are treated as if they were a black box that cannot, and should not, be 
investigated.4 Any decision an individual takes is regarded as an expression of their ‘free 
will’(see Fellner and Spash 2015). 
The primary societal objective of an idealised neoliberal society then becomes the pursuit 
of economic freedom as market choice, which presupposes establishing and protecting ‘free’ 
3 Here economics itself is redefined as the study of individual choice based on Lionel Robbins (1984 
[1932]: 16) prescriptive definition relating to human behaviour and the fulfilling of ends based on 
scarce means which have alternative uses. This approach was adopted by the Chicago School and 
epitomised by Gary S. Becker’s economic writings, which applied the ‘economic’ choice model to 
everything from buying a cup of coffee to marriage and even suicide (Becker 1976). 
4 That preferences should go unquestioned aligns with the tradition in mainstream economics of 
regarding preferences as being exogenous and given either a priori or as innate. Even when 
preferences are treated as endogenous, their role and meaning has remained unquestioned and 
unquestionable (see discussion in an environmental context by Spash 2008). 
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markets. A market is ‘free’, according to Friedman (2002 [1962]: 13f), if all of its transactions 
are undertaken by individuals or private firms and are strictly voluntary (i.e., if nobody is 
forced to enter into a transaction). The outcome produced by such markets is then conceived 
of as an unintended order that emerges spontaneously as the result of a multitude of human 
actions. Following Hayek’s ‘evolutionary’ understanding of social progress, markets are 
deemed to provide the best instrument to coordinate individual knowledge, interests and 
purposes for the benefit of society as a whole (Hayek 2011 [1960]: 91f; Gamble 1996: 27f). 
Two social institutions are claimed to be absolutely vital for a functioning market system. 
First, there needs to be a universal system of enforceable private property rights and contracts. 
Only if a person is certain about their exclusive control over some material objects (or they 
know who else is in control), are they assumed to be able to carry out a coherent plan of 
action (Hayek 2011 [1960]: 207). Second, in order to curb coercive power in market 
interaction, competition is necessary between both sellers and buyers. It is the decisive 
mechanism through which markets are believed to produce spontaneous order (Hayek 1948: 
21; 2011 [1960]: 88; Friedman 2002 [1962]: 14f; Gamble 1996: 69f). 
Under this political economy, any attempt to interfere with market mechanisms is 
regarded as likely to obstruct their ability to achieve spontaneous self-organisation, and hence 
carries the risk of reducing both individual liberty and social prosperity. In particular, 
concentrations of power are identified as a major threat preventing markets from fulfilling 
their full potential (Friedman 2002 [1962]: 15; Friedman and Friedman 1980: 309). In this 
context, there is a clear prioritisation of capital over labour. Indeed, as Barry (1979: 50f) 
notes, Hayek regards trade unions as posing a much greater menace to liberty than the power 
of employers or monopolies on the side of capital. As a result, his vision of a ‘free’ society 
deprives workers of their right to organise collectively and pool their bargaining power, while 
capitalist monopolies are accepted as legitimate (i.e., naturalising corporate power). 
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Hayek and Friedman also consistently target government power and the role of State 
authorities as needing to be tamed and curtailed. Yet, despite their vigorous anti-State 
rhetoric, their conceptualisations of an ideal society require the existence of a strong 
neoliberal State, heavily involved in the lives of its citizens, even if this is restricted by the 
meta-legal principles of the ‘rule of law’ (Hayek 2011 [1960]: 232f). The neoliberal State’s 
main task is to enforce and safeguard the conditions required for markets to be operative (e.g., 
a functioning price system, property rights, contract law, judiciary and national security) and 
protect individuals against reciprocal acts of coercion (Ibid: 71f, 312). In addition, the State is 
responsible for spreading market logic to all spheres of social life, ultimately aiming at a 
social order entirely based on competitive, market-like structures (e.g., through policies of 
deregulation and privatisation, dismantling of the welfare state and opening-up of new 
markets for the nation State’s business interests). 
In such an idealised neoliberal society, inequality is not only accepted as an outcome, but 
even deemed a necessary precondition for markets to function properly and society to flourish 
(Friedman 2002 [1962]: 161f; Hayek 2011 [1960]: 96, 104). The only type of equality 
conceived as desirable is equality before the law, which is viewed as incompatible with 
material equality (Hayek 2011 [1960]: 150; Friedman 2002 [1962]: 195). The two forms are 
regarded as mutually exclusive, because deliberately bringing about material equality would 
necessitate taking from some to give to others, which is to treat people differently and so, the 
argument goes, inequitably. In true trickle-down fashion, Hayek contends that ‘[e]ven the 
poorest today owe their relative material well-being to the results of past inequality’ (Hayek 
2011 [1960]: 98). Any form of social planning that attempts to balance out an unequal 
distribution of material endowments—and, thus, ultimately also of actual opportunities—is 
rejected by both Hayek and Friedman as an infringement on individual liberty. In the long 
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run, for them, only if market mechanisms are left to operate ‘freely’ can society achieve 
freedom for the individual and generate the greatest public good. 
2.2 An Alternative Notion of Freedom for a Degrowth Society 
There is no explicit formulation of freedom in the degrowth discourse. However, many of its 
proponents share a common understanding of what kind of society they deem desirable, 
including the institutions, modes of organisation, values and social objectives they consider 
valuable. Castoriadis, who died before degrowth emerged as a social movement, developed 
two concepts—‘social imaginary’ and ‘autonomy’—that have had a great and lasting impact 
on key scholars within the degrowth movement (Latouche 2014, 2009; Kallis 2011, 2019; 
Asara, Profumi, and Kallis 2013; Muraca 2013; Deriu 2014a). The wide acceptance of his 
deliberations on autonomy within the degrowth literature, and the almost canonical reference 
made to them, justify regarding his work as central to a radical and alternative rethinking of 
freedom. 
Castoriadis defines autonomy as the lucid (i.e., conscious) self-legislation of both 
individuals and collectives (Castoriadis 1983: 308). At the individual level, being autonomous 
implies that the institutions (i.e., conventions, norms, rules and regulations) guiding a person 
in their action and thought are not imposed on them by some external force, but by subjects 
themselves. Even though individuals can never entirely evade the influence of their 
unconscious psyche and historical, cultural and social context, out of which they think and 
act, total independence from these mechanisms is neither desired nor required for an 
individual to be free. Instead, what autonomy implies is a particular mode of being in which a 
person rejects becoming a passive product of their psyche and history in favour of being an 
active co-author of their own life (Castoriadis 1991: 165). This presupposes practices of 
introspection, reflection and deliberation, that help the individual to step back from their own 
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internalised behaviours, routines, beliefs and desires, in order to critically evaluate their 
meaning, validity and desirability (Kalyvas 1998: 170; Kioupkiolis 2012: 150). An 
autonomous individual should aim to attain an active relationship to, and engagement with, 
their own psyche and societal influences, while accepting they are unable to fully control 
them. 
According to Castoriadis, a reflective and deliberative subjectivity paves the way for a 
third element of vital importance for individual autonomy, ‘radical imagination’ (Castoriadis 
1991: 165). As part of an individual’s psyche this relates to acts of ‘positing, creating and 
bringing-into-being’ (Gezerlis 2001: 482). The enormous creative capacity innate to human 
beings enables them to envision alternatives in the construction of themselves and their lives 
that exceed the range of already available forms. This is vital, since it helps in the formation 
of resistance against social powers, which, in Castoriadis’ opinion, are manipulative, in as far 
as they predetermine what one perceives as conceivable and eligible options (Kioupkiolis 
2012: 153). 
Against the backdrop of these considerations, being free is not then a status that can be 
achieved once and for all, but rather requires a sustained effort, a continuous struggle, or, as 
Kioupkiolis (2012: 151) puts it, an ‘agonistic process’. This is understood as a fight against 
internal and external forces that constantly try to impose their meanings and laws on the 
individual, holding them captive in static patterns and thereby threatening to impede 
alternative possibilities (Castoriadis 1991: 163; 1997: 264). This makes practices of self-
engagement, emancipation and self-empowerment important mechanisms for achieving 
freedom. Going beyond the narrow neoliberal focus on the ‘freedom from’ external acts of 
coercion, Castoriadis’ conception hence emphasises the freedom from both external and
internal constraints. It also transcends negative freedom by opening up the door for creative 
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acts of self-identification and self-realisation, highlighting the freedom ‘of’ a person ‘to’ 
achieve certain ends. 
Individual autonomy involves intersubjectivity (Castoriadis 1991: 164), which relates to 
the inextricable embeddedness of individuals in social relations (Castoriadis 1987 [1975]: 
108). This signifies a crucial difference from liberal theory and its methodological 
individualism. Castoriadis’ notion of autonomy does not define the individual as an isolated 
person existing separately in society. Rather, it conceives of them as being inevitably social, 
socially connected and embedded, as a person of society. Consequently, following Castoriadis 
(1991: 166), an individual can neither be free on their own, nor under all forms of social 
structure. A specific type of society is needed that allows its members to realise autonomy 
both at the individual and the collective level (Castoriadis 1987 [1975]: 107). This implies the 
possibility of taking part in the processes whereby society is institutionalised. This is where 
negotiation and desires occur as to social meanings, or ‘social imaginary significations’ 
(Castoriadis 1991: 41), and their entailed societal rules, norms and objectives. This condition 
is linked to the second facet of autonomy, social autonomy. 
For Castoriadis, social autonomy means that a society posits its own laws and institutions 
in a collective way, while its members know that they are the source of these laws. The 
institutions governing the lives of the members of a community are decided upon through 
democratic processes, and these institutions are themselves understood as self-imposed 
constructs. As a consequence, rather than permanent they are perceived of as contingent, 
human-made structures open to interrogation and deliberate alteration (Castoriadis 1997 
[1983]: 310).  
Politics is understood as ‘the reflective and lucid collective activity that aims at the 
overall institution of society’ (Castoriadis 1991: 169). Going far beyond nation States and 
representative democracies, politics encompasses all the activities and processes in which the 
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members of a society discuss, interpret and (re)define the norms, aims and limits of their own 
social institutions. All aspects of public life—‘everything in society that is participable [sic] 
and shareable’ (Ibid)—should be politicised (i.e., be open to collective evaluation, debate and 
reconsideration). While autonomy does not require each and every social law to be approved 
by every single member of society, it implies that they have the ‘effective possibility of 
participating actively in the formation and the implementation of the law’ (Ibid: 167). This is 
a key prerequisite for individuals to be able to endorse a particular social institution that is 
governing their life, i.e., to say, lucidly and reflectively, that ‘this law is also mine’. 
On the basis that there is a plurality of individual ends and goals, and assuming that the 
value of autonomy as such is accepted, democracy becomes an indispensable condition for 
both social and individual autonomy, and, thus, a free society. Castoriadis refers to democracy 
as ‘the effective possibility of equal participation of all in instituting activities as well as in 
explicit power’ (Ibid: 168). An autonomous society presupposes a wide-scale democratisation 
of social relations as well as an institutional framework which enables and encourages all 
individuals to take part in collective deliberation and decision-making. At the same time, a 
‘true’ democracy is supposed to ensure and protect a free private sphere of their members,5
and establish an economic sphere characterised by a variety of different modes of production 
and organisation (Castoriadis 1997 [1989]: 405-411). In order to ensure equal opportunities to 
participate in the instituting activities of a society, these economic institutions should be 
directed at providing a minimal livelihood for every citizen, reducing disparities of wealth and 
power and increasing individual autonomy. 
5 Hence, autonomy presupposes a system of (negative) rights which licence and protect a 
diversification of being and safeguards individuals from infringements by other individuals or the 
community (Kioupkiolis 2012: 167). Following Castoriadis (1997 [1989]: 405-413), these rights and 
liberties have to be agreed on collectively, but should include some minimal human rights and the 
achievement of past democratic struggles. 
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Degrowth can then be placed within the context of Castoriadis thought, while also going 
beyond his ideas. Here new concepts enter the picture and offer a democratisation of the 
social and economic spheres—such as ‘commoning’, which returns to localised group 
organisation of resource use (Akbulut 2017; Helfrich and Bollier 2014; Euler 2019), and 
‘tools for conviviality’, which question the role of technology and technologically driven 
change and place it in the context of social relations (Deriu 2014b; Illich 1973). These 
concepts raise the potential for mechanisms to counter the disempowerment inherent in 
capitalist modes of (re)production and consumer society. For example, they raise the need to 
prevent the conversion of individuals into consumers dependent on industrial output and 
technocratic structures. Moreover, in a social-ecological transformation, that aligns social 
provisioning with needs, a society based on commoning and conviviality would empower its 
members to liberate themselves from market capitalism and norms of hedonic consumerism 
and profit-maximisation.  
More generally, the vision of a degrowth society challenges the utopia of a continually 
growing, technologically driven material economy, whether capitalist or of any other form. 
The idea of freedom is then no longer allied with endless consumption possibilities, but rather 
to be found in the ability of the individual and collectives to negotiate and set their own limits 
(Kallis 2019; Kallis and March 2015). While neoliberal freedom is likely to foster the 
production of passive consumers, whose freedom is mostly limited to choice in the market 
place and constrained by pre-established institutional ties, an idealised degrowth society 
would be constituted of proactive, self-conscious and self-constituting citizens. Such citizens 
would be involved in the creation of the structures and institutions which delimit their own 
range of action. This is the essence of self-limitation, instead of being understood as an 
inevitable reaction to scarcity, impending catastrophes or other external imperatives, being a 
lucid process of self-determination and thus an inherently emancipatory action. 
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According to Kallis and March (2015: 363), Castoriadis placed concerns over ecological 
degradation within the context of self-limitation that brings ‘true’ freedom, rather than 
interpreting it as love of Nature. Adams (2012: 316) believes that Castoriadis understood the 
environmental movement as a reactivation of the project of autonomy, reiterating the need for 
collective self-limitation that is necessarily absent from the capitalist and techno-scientific 
pursuit of unlimited rational mastery. From this perspective, degrowth becomes an expression 
of self-limitation as freedom at the societal level. By analogy, at the individual level, the 
conscious decision to live a frugal life of sufficiency is perceived as a potential source of 
freedom rather than a constraint. 
For Castoriadis (1991: 168), there is also a ‘reciprocal implication of equality and 
freedom’, since freedom ought to be accessible to everybody in the same way. Based on the 
awareness of economic, social, cultural, psychological and power structures and their impact 
on actual opportunities of self-awareness, political participation and self-realisation, this 
implies the need for redistributive measures. These should reduce material inequalities (and 
thus relations of dependence and subordination) and establish equal opportunities that lead to 
a life that is self-determined for all within autonomous social communities. 
3. How do Members of the Degrowth Community Conceptualise Freedom? 
Table 1 summarises the two theories of freedom in terms of ten key concepts identified as 
constitutive for a free neoliberal and Castoriadian degrowth society. The concepts refer to 
social, political, economic, psychological and institutional conditions without which freedom, 
from the respective point of view, is inconceivable. They are paired in such a way as to 
contrast and highlight fundamental discrepancies between the two positions related to a 
specific topic.  Due to the omission of freedom as an explicit topic in degrowth debates, there 
remains uncertainty as to whether the conceptualisation depicted on the right-hand side of 
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Table 1 coincides with the actual views prevalent in the degrowth community. Therefore, an 
empirical study was conducted to help investigate this potential gap, and explore how 
degrowth advocates relate to the concept of freedom. 
Table 1. Two Theories of Freedom 
Topic Free Neoliberal Society Free Castoriadian Degrowth Society 
1. Individual & society: Methodological individualism Social and ecological embeddedness 
2. Vision of the social realm: Economisation (Re)politicisation 
3. Governance: Neoliberal State and Rule of Law Deep democracy 
4. Guiding principle(s): Competition Reflection, deliberation, imagination 
5. Main property relation: Private property  Commoning 
6. Primary type of freedom: Liberty (absence of external coercion) Autonomy (conscious self-legislation) 
7. Central act of freedom: Free choice on markets Self-limitation 
8. Source of emancipation:  Self-regulating markets Continuous struggle 
9. Economic power relations: Minimisation of (non-capital-related)  
power concentrations 
Conviviality 
10. Distributive justice: Inequality Equality 
3.1 Study Design 
The questionnaire was designed in three main sections. Part I consisted of two sets of 
questions. First, respondents were asked to imagine being in ten different scenarios relating to 
constraints on their personal freedom (CPF). They were asked the extent to which they would 
feel constrained by the scenario and to record on a five-level Likert item, from (1) ‘not at all 
constrained’ to (5) ‘seriously constrained’. A separate score (0) was allowed for ‘don’t know’ 
responses. Each scenario corresponded to a certain constitutive element of either the 
neoliberal or Castoriadian- degrowth theory. The design took a common context in which the 
respondents might find themselves and introduced an aspect of freedom implicitly into a 
specific concrete example. The CPF scenarios are represented in Table 2 and the full wording 
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is given in Appendix 1. The expected responses are from the perspective of an individual who 
is committed to the Castoriadian-degrowth theory of freedom outlined in Section 2.2. 
Table 2. Scenarios Relating to Constraints on Personal Freedom (CPF) 




Theoretical Concept(s) Conceptual Ideology 
N 1 I have to bow to the majority 
vote. 
Unconstrained Individualism vs. collective 
decision-making 
Neoliberal 
N 2 There is no possibility for me 




Absolute reliance on markets Neoliberal 
N 3 There is only one show model 
to choose. 
Unconstrained Choice between consumption 
alternatives 
Neoliberal 
N 4 I don’t want to pay taxes, but I 
must. 
Unconstrained State coercion & 
redistribution 
Neoliberal 




Structural constraints without 
overt coercion 
Degrowth 
D 2 I’d love to learn dancing, but I 
can’t afford dance classes. 
Seriously 
constrained 
Material means & actual 
opportunities 
Degrowth 
D 3 I decided to stop flying for 
environmental reasons. 




D 4 I’m trying hard to fulfil my 
parents’ dream without being 










Democracy & political 
participation 
Degrowth 




Industrial & expert 
dependence vs. convivial tools 
Degrowth 
Second, thirteen conceptual statements on freedom (CSF) were presented to respondents 
who were asked for their degree of agreement with each. Again, a five-level Likert item was 
employed for each, with the level of agreement being assessed from (1) ‘completely disagree’ 
to (5) ‘completely agree’, and again with (0) ‘don’t know’. Each item was based on a key 
assumption of either the neoliberal or the Catoriadian-degrowth concepts of freedom. In 
contrast to the specific context of the CPF items, here the aim was to get respondents to 
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address more general theoretical aspects. Table 3, summarising the CSF, shows their 
relationship to specific ideological positions and gives the expected response from a person 
committed to the degrowth conception of freedom; full wording is given in Appendix 2. The 
order of both CPF and CSF items was randomised in the questionnaire. 
Table 3. Conceptual Statements on Freedom (CSF) 




Theoretical Concept(s) Conceptual Ideology 
N 1 Overall societal progress justifies 
an unequal distribution of 
freedom. 
Disagree Utilitarianism & 
inequality 
Neoliberal 
N 2 Without the right to possess 
private property, it is impossible 
for me to be free. 
Disagree Private property Neoliberal 
N 3 The market mechanism creates a 
more socially beneficial order 
than human planning. 
Disagree Market mechanism & 
competition 
Neoliberal 
N 4 Redistributional policies should 
be rejected as a threat to 
individual freedom. 
Disagree Individualism & absence 
of coercion 
Neoliberal 
N 5 Economic freedom is essential 
because it makes markets work 
properly. 
Disagree Economic freedom Neoliberal 
N 6 Economic freedom is more 
essential than political rights. 
Disagree Primacy of the economic Neoliberal 
D 1 Freedom implies the chance to go 
beyond the already available. 
Agree Creativity, emancipation, 
self-empowerment 
Degrowth 
D 2 Self-limitation is an expression of 
freedom. 
Agree Self-limitation Degrowth 
D 3 Being free implies having a say in 
the making of societal rules and 
principles. 
Agree Political participation & 
self-legislation 
Degrowth 
D 4 Collectively owning and 
managing property leads to a 
more free society. 
Agree Commoning Degrowth 
D 5 In a free society, societal norms 
must be open to challenge and 
collective reconsideration. 
Agree Social autonomy Degrowth 
D 6 In a degrowth society, being free 
primarily means to be 
autonomous. 
Agree Autonomy Degrowth 
D 7 Freedom implies a continuous 
struggle. 




Part II of the questionnaire consisted of three questions. First, respondents were asked to 
indicate the single most important condition for them to feel free by choosing one of six 
options. Each of the options reflected an underlying belief related to a dominant position in 
philosophical debates about freedom: negative liberty, positive liberty, autonomy, freedom as 
independence, deliberate will-formation and self-emancipation. While, from a neoliberal 
theoretical viewpoint, negative liberty is clearly given priority over all other types of freedom, 
a person adopting a degrowth viewpoint would be expected to emphasise autonomy, positive 
liberty, deliberate will-formation or self-emancipation. 
Second, Part II of the survey included an open-ended question that gave respondents the 
opportunity to share what they believed were other preconditions necessary for them to be 
free, beyond the ones mentioned in the first question. This aimed to gain additional 
information about personal interpretations of freedom independently of the theoretical 
theories. New facets of freedom, that might have been neglected in the theories, could then be 
introduced by respondents. 
Third, another closed-ended question focused on the role of freedom in a possible 
degrowth society. The aim was to discover whether participants considered the pursuit of 
freedom compatible with degrowth and, if yes, what role they assigned to it in the value 
hierarchy of an ideal degrowth society. For this purpose, respondents were requested to pick 
one of four statements that held freedom should be either: (i) the single most important value 
in a degrowth society; (ii) one of its central principles, together with others; (iii) secondary to 
other, more important values; or (iv) rejected as a guiding principle due to its incompatibility 
with degrowth. 
Part III consisted of a set of seven questions focusing on demographic and socio-
economic information: age, gender identity, level of education, employment status, income, 
religious beliefs and nationality. These factors (e.g., educational attainment) could potentially 
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link to a person’s understanding of freedom. However, the primary use in the current context 
is to report on the socio-economic make-up of the sample. 
3.2 Sample and Results  
The survey was conducted at the 6th International Degrowth Conference for Ecological 
Sustainability and Social Equity in Malmö, Sweden, between the 21st and 25th of August 
2018. In total, 300 hard copies of the questionnaire were distributed, of which 146 (49%) 
were returned. The sample size in relation to the total number of conference participants (800) 
was thus slightly above 18%. The majority (76%) of respondents were under 34 years old, and 
highly educated (91% having a university degree, N=145). The gender distribution was 
relatively equal (52% female vs. 43% male, N=145). Nationality (N=139) was biased with 
51% Germanic (43% German, 8% Austrian), followed by French (8%) and Italian (7%). 
In a Likert item assessment, as in Part I, respondents who lack a strong belief are 
expected to tend to the middle option (see Nadler et al. 2015). Therefore, in the analysis, 
emphasis is placed on the more extreme answers for each scenario or statement. Following 
this approach, Table 4 lists the codes of the ten CPF scenarios as well as the expected and 
obtained responses presented as four groups: (i) those who felt more than moderately 
constrained (scores 4 and 5), (ii) those who felt moderately constrained (score 3), (iii) those 
who felt not at all or less than moderately constrained (scores 1 and 2), and (iv) those who 
answered ‘don’t know’ (item score 0). The scenarios are arranged in order of their mean 
rating, starting with the cases that respondents regarded as posing the greatest threat to their 
personal freedom. 
Comparing the expected with the actual answers shows that, apart from CPF-N1 and 
CPF-D3, the outcome is in line with the values predicted. This implies an overall inclination 
among respondents towards the notion of freedom conceptualised on the basis of Castoriadis’ 
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concept of autonomy. The two exceptions were also the only cases that did not yield an 
absolute majority on either side of the item scale (i.e., seriously constrained or unconstrained). 
In fact, assessment of these items was quite divided and will be discussed further in Section 4. 















    N % N % N % N % 
D 1 SC 146 4.5 133 91 6 4 5 3 2 1 
D 5 SC 146 4.2 115 79 19 13 9 6 3 2 
D 6 SC 146 3.7 90 62 34 23 22 15 0 0 
N 2 SC 144 3.7 87 60 29 20 23 16 5 3 
D 4 SC 145 3.6 84 58 27 19 25 17 9 6 
D 2 SC 146 3.6 83 57 40 27 22 15 1 1 
N 1 UC 145 3.0 34 23 61 42 41 28 9 6 
D 3 UC 146 2.9 43 29 48 33 52 36 3 2 
N 3 UC 146 2.7 36 25 34 23 75 51 1 1 
N 4 UC 146 2.3 20 14 41 28 82 56 3 2 
Notes: 
¹ UC = unconstrained; SC = seriously constrained 
² Excluding ‘Don’t know’ 
³ Sum for Likert score 1/2 (not or only slightly constrained), 3 (moderately constrained), and 
4/5 (seriously constrained). Marked in dark grey are absolute majorities (i.e. more than 50% 
of all respondents rating a scenario as either seriously freedom-constraining or not/only 
slightly constraining). 
A similar presentation of results is given in Table 5 for the CSF items. There is a 
majority position among survey participants as to their conceptualisations, as evident from 
there being only one item that was neither agreed nor disagreed upon by more than 50% of 
respondents. However, this statement refers to the interpretation of freedom as autonomy, a 
central element of the Castoriadian conceptualisation of freedom. Apart from this item, all of 
the statements were accepted by the majority of respondents and support the anticipated 
degrowth position, while all of the statements that were broadly rejected are connected to the 
neoliberal concept of freedom. 
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Size Mean² Agree³ Neutral³ Disagree³ 
Don’t 
know 
    N % N % N % N % 
D 7 A 144 4.3 122 85 8 6 7 5 7 5 
D 5 A 144 4.2 118 82 14 10 9 6 3 2 
D 3 A 145 4.2 127 88 6 4 11 8 1 1 
D 4 A 145 4.0 112 77 16 11 7 5 10 7 
D 2 A 145 4.0 107 74 19 13 13 9 6 4 
D 1 A 145 3.7 89 61 22 15 24 17 10 7 
D 6 A 145 3.1 57 39 32 22 43 30 13 9 
N 1 D 142 2.2 23 16 18 13 96 68 5 3 
N 6 D 145 2.2 8 5 26 18 78 54 33 23 
N 2 D 143 2.0 19 13 10 7 112 78 2 1 
N 5 D 145 1.9 6 4 21 14 104 72 14 10 
N 3 D 145 1.9 8 5 15 10 111 77 11 8 
N 4 D 144 1.5 3 2 5 3 130 90 6 4 
Notes: 
¹ A = agree; D = disagree 
² Excluding ‘Don’t know’ 
³ Sum for Likert score 1/2 (disagree), 3 (neutral), and 4/5 (agree). Marked in dark grey are absolute majorities (i.e. more than 
50% of all respondents agreeing or disagreeing with a statement).
The answers to the first question from Part II of the questionnaire show that 
approximately a quarter of participants reported that the single most important condition for 
their freedom was the ability to deliberately form and endorse one’s beliefs and desires (i.e., 
deliberate will-formation), while a fifth selected the capacity to be in control over one’s own 
life (i.e., autonomy). Both these positions are constitutive of the Castoriadian theory. A fifth 
of respondents also opted for freedom as independence from the arbitrary power of others. 
These responses focus on independence and autonomy, and clearly go beyond the neoliberal 
theory’s purely negative notion of freedom. This highlights the importance of the origin and 
nature of a person’s desires and beliefs, a domain completely excluded from consideration by 
the neoliberal theory. At the same time, however, there does remain a substantive minority 
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(15%) committed to the negative and neoliberal consistent concept of freedom (see Appendix 
3). 
Part II also asked an open-ended question on pre-conditions for freedom, in addition to 
those already mentioned in the preceding question. In comparison to the closed-ended 
question, the number of non-respondents was relatively high (30%). Respondents could give 
more than one answer, and the 102 respondents gave a total of 120 suggestions. These 
answers were analysed in terms of their content, by means of a quantitative frequency analysis 
(Mayring 2014: 22), and classified into seventeen categories (see Appendix 4). The three 
categories subsuming the most frequently mentioned answers were the following: free and 
equal access to education and knowledge (22%), being able to satisfy basic human needs 
(16%) and acceptance, support and self-efficacy in a community and/or social relationships 
(9%). None of the remaining categories crossed the 5% threshold. The main outcome supports 
an interpretation of freedom that is grounded in material and social conditions for leading a 
meaningful and self-determined life. This implies a more substantive, positive notion of 
freedom as compared to the rather formal, negative, neoliberal one. The focus in the highest 
frequency categories on actualising opportunities and their equal distribution is compatible 
with the Castoriadian-degrowth theory, while being at odds with central assumptions on 
which the neoliberal interpretation rests. The results also indicate support for the 
embeddedness of individuals in social relations and the entailed view of humans as inherently 
social beings. 
The responses to the third question from Part II show that the vast majority (97%) 
selected an option that finds freedom is compatible with a degrowth society. Most (76%) 
believed freedom should constitute a guiding principle, but few (2%) considered it to be the 
single most important value. Instead, the importance of other fundamental principles was 
emphasised, and for some respondents (19%) these exceeded the importance of freedom. 
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Only 3% believed that the pursuit of freedom is incompatible with the idea and goals of 
degrowth and should thus be abandoned. 
4 Interpretation and Discussion 
4.1 General Agreement with the ‘Castoriadian-Degrowth Theory of Freedom’ 
Overall, there was a clear majority position amongst respondents that is compatible with the 
understanding of freedom conceptualised on the basis of Castoriadis’ notion of autonomy. 
This is most evident in the results for the CPF items. Having to work extra hours under the 
pressure of losing one’s job (CPF-D1) was voted by more than half of the respondents to be 
severely constraining their freedom. Additionally, more than a third stated that they would 
feel more than moderately constrained in a similar situation. This represents the role of 
structural power constraints (such as social and economic pressures) operating without any 
overt coercion but as a significant factor influencing the extent to which respondents feel 
free/unfree. This view contradicts Hayek’s narrow negative definition of freedom. It involves 
a much broader understanding that includes structures, societal arrangements and the specific 
social-economic context of an individual. The high ratings for scenario CPF-D2 support this 
claim. They reveal the centrality of actual opportunities to realise one’s aims and desires, 
which is entirely neglected in the neoliberal theory. 
In terms of the central role of economics and markets given to freedom by the neoliberal 
position, this is also broadly rejected. The results for scenario CPF-N2 allude to the perceived 
threat to personal freedom arising from an absolute reliance or dependence on market 
structures. The firm belief in a causal relationship between markets and freedom, embraced by 
both Hayek and Friedman, appears to be rejected by the bulk of participants. In fact, they 
seem to oppose the central neoliberal assumption that markets present the most important 
precondition for individual freedom. Similarly, the fact that more than 50% fail to consider 
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their freedom limited in scenario CPF-N3 indicates that consumption alternatives, a 
precondition for freedom defined as choice (Friedman 2002 [1962]), are mostly regarded as 
unnecessary in order to feel free. 
The obligation to pay taxes, combined with the threat of punishment (CPF-N4), is a 
prime example of coercion and thus considered a major constraint on individual freedom by 
many neoliberals. Yet, this is only regarded as gravely impacting on freedom by 14% of 
respondents. This outcome might be grounded in a different understanding of freedom, one 
that is non-individualistic and avoids the defining aspect of coercion, while being closely tied 
to the well-being of others and society overall. The inclusion of collective responsibility and 
actual opportunities into the web of conditions for individual freedom implies the need for 
some degree of material equality, necessitating a distributing mechanism other than the 
market and an assumed meritocracy. This could be one plausible explanation why an 
obligation to pay taxes is, overall, not judged as a threat to individual freedom. 
The rating for scenario CPF-D5 strongly supports the central position of political 
participation constitutive for the degrowth conceptualisation of freedom. Similarly, case CPF-
D6 reveals a general agreement with the interpretation of the capitalist mode of production 
and the entailed dependence on industry and experts as a main source of ‘unfreedom’, as 
proposed by Illich (1973) and others in his tradition. Moreover, scenario CPF-D4 indicates 
that the majority of respondents regard being free as implying a certain degree of deliberate 
will-formation, self-awareness and reflexivity, marking a proximity to Castoriadis’ notion of 
autonomy. 
This overall agreement with the Castoriadian-degrowth theory can also be observed in 
the assessments of the CSF items. The results here reflect a general consensus which is based 
on the rejection of central aspects of neoliberal freedom. These include: the threat to freedom 
connected to redistributional policies (CSF-N4), the assumption of a self-regulating market 
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mechanism and its priority over human planning (CSF-N3), the centrality of economic 
freedom (CSF-N5), the right to possess private property (CSF-N2), the priority of competitive 
markets over political rights (CSF-N6) and the consequentialist justification of an unequal 
distribution of freedom (CSF-N1). At the same time the results are grounded on the 
affirmation of core characteristics of the Castoriadian degrowth concept of freedom. These are 
the identification of freedom with a continuous effort and agonistic process (CSF-D7), the 
condition that all societal rules, norms and principles need to be open to collective scrutiny 
and reconsideration (CS-D5), the importance of political participation and self-determination 
(CS-D3), the sympathy for collective ownership and commoning (CS-D4), the interpretation 
of self-limitation as an act of freedom (CS-D2) and the relevance of self-emancipation, 
openness and creativity (CS-D1).  
4.2 Indicators of an Under-Conceptualisation of Freedom 
Despite the general agreement outlined above, some of the results bring into question an 
alignment with the pre-theorised conceptualisation of freedom for degrowth. This is the case 
for the two scenarios that were rated by a majority as ‘moderately constraining’ (an item score 
of 3): CPF-N1 and CPF-D3. The fact that most people, in judging these situations, opted for 
the middle option, might signify either that many respondents lacked a strong belief about the 
scenarios or that they were too uncertain about their evaluation of the situation to choose a 
stronger position. This could apply especially to the referendum scenario (CPF-N1), where 
42% picked the median option. However, there also appears to be a strong disagreement 
between respondents, most obviously in the scenario about the environmentally motivated 
decision to stop flying (CPF-D3), where 29% rated it as seriously constraining, whereas 36% 
rated it as not very constraining. How can these contrary positions be explained? 
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First, this could reflect the heterogeneity of conference participants. As Eversberg and 
Schmelzer (2018: 245) found, in a survey of degrowth participants at the 2014 Degrowth 
Conference in Leipzig, there appears to be a broad diversity within, what they term, the 
‘degrowth spectrum’. They did identify some widely shared basic concerns amongst their 
respondents (e.g., economic growth as destructive leading to the need to reduce material 
wealth in the Global North via democratic means involving female emancipation and non-
violence). However, there was also considerable substantive variety in how they related to the 
degrowth movement. As summarised by Spash (2018), their study identified five groups: (C1) 
sufficiency-oriented critics of modernity with an eco-radical aspect; (C2) techno-optimist 
reformers who think within existing structures, are sympathetic towards conservative politics 
and have weak personal practice; (C3) mostly German young female students believing in a 
kind of classic liberal individual agency and pacifism; (C4) mostly German urban male 
traditional left wingers holding a somewhat theoretical, techno-optimist position with a focus 
on redistribution; (C5) another left wing group against capitalism and social domination, 
experimenting with alternative living. In terms of the overall sample, clusters C1, C3 and C5 
were 22%-23% each, C2 19% and C4 13%. The authors regard C5 as the most consistent with 
the degrowth ideal of mediating theory and practice through self-transformation. In terms of 
relating to the current study, we can note the conservative politics and weak degrowth 
practices of C2 and the classic liberalism of C3, mean around 40% of their sample, could hold 
a position on freedom consistent with the neoliberal theory. Their groups also evidence some 
stark differences of opinion. For example, 45% of C1 wanted a ban on long-haul pleasure 
flights, whereas two-thirds of C2 were against this and exhibited frequent flying behaviour. 
Their overall sample was also found wanting in several other environmental aspects with 69% 
supporting long-haul flying for pleasure, 66% pro-technology and 54% against old lifestyles, 
68% holding social inequity above climate change and 75% supporting individual consumer-
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based action (i.e., agency over structure). This last position is clearly also consistent with 
neoliberal freedom. In addition, 34% did not want degrowth to be distanced from conservative 
thought. There is then evidence not only of diverging and contradictory positions on a number 
of issues relating to freedom, but also of the presence of hegemonic concepts of freedom 
amongst a substantive part of their sample. 
Second, the fact that freedom is seldom explicitly theorised in the degrowth community 
implies that it is under-conceptualised. This could help to explain why many survey 
participants appear to find a situation in which they have to consciously consider committing 
to stop an otherwise normalised behaviour (such as flying) as severely freedom-inhibiting. 
Here there is an implicit value conflict that appears to remain unarticulated. A behaviour or 
practice may be regarded as necessary for their personal freedom despite the awareness of its 
destructive environmental and social consequences and its impacts on others (i.e., human and 
non-human, present and future). Remarkably, while almost 75% of respondents endorsed the 
abstract idea of freedom as self-limitation (expressed in CFS-D2), many were unable to 
confirm their commitment when confronted by a concrete example. 
Thus, we hypothesise that the underlying understanding of freedom of a non-negligible 
share of respondents is still based on internalised neoliberal principles and values. That is, the 
parameters of freedom remain conceptualised in terms of individualism, neglect of social and 
environmental responsibility and maximisation of personal consumption opportunities.  
If we turn next to the thirteen CSF items, only one (CFS-D6) was neither agreed nor 
disagreed upon by a total majority. Unexpectedly, this was the statement on autonomy, a key 
concept for Castoriadis. The statement was phrased as follows: ‘In a degrowth society, being 
free primarily means to be autonomous (i.e., self-governing)’. A third of participants actually 
disagreed with the statement. Rejection might indicate departure from Castoriadis’ political 
philosophy and his project of autonomy. However, this is not necessarily the case, because 
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40% did actually agree with the statement. Furthermore, many of the key characteristics of 
Castoriadis’ interpretation of autonomy were approved of by respondents (e.g., CFS-D7, CFS-
D5, CFS-D3 and CFS-D1). Also, the first question of Part II resulted in 20% of respondents 
declaring that ‘being in control of my own life’ constitutes the most essential condition for 
them to be free, while 26% chose ‘forming and endorsing my beliefs and desires deliberately, 
not blindly’. Respondents appear to be more likely to endorse autonomy when it is implicitly 
stated rather than explicitly. This hints at an underdeveloped understanding of and/or a lack of 
consideration given to the concept. 
Further evidence for the claim that the conceptualisation of freedom amongst survey 
participants is neither fully elaborate nor entirely consistent with the degrowth vision is 
provided by the outcome for statement CFS-N6. Strikingly, 23% stated that they ‘didn’t 
know’ whether they consider economic freedom or political rights as more important for a 
free society. In addition, close to 18% opted for the neutral middle option. From a degrowth 
perspective this widespread doubt is problematic. Equal political rights are a cornerstone of 
any degrowth vision. This is supported by the survey participants themselves, for instance in 
their assessment of scenario CPF-D5, where almost 80% felt their freedom would be seriously 
constrained if they had no possibility for political participation. Similarly, 82% said they 
could not consider themselves free if they had no say in the making of the rules and principles 
that determine their own scope of action. At the same time, the dependence on markets is 
clearly perceived as freedom-constraining (e.g., responses to CPF-N2). Also, the claim that 
economic freedom is essential because it makes markets work (CFS-N5) was univocally 
dismissed by 72% of respondents. 
How can the evidence for a failure to decide between economic freedom and political 
rights be explained? The most plausible answer is to be found in the original phrasing of 
statement CS-N6, which left economic freedom implicit and formulated it as an ‘economic 
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system that guarantees that no one is being forced into transactions’—a definition employed 
by Friedman (2002 [1962]). Respondents appear to have found judging and rejecting a 
specific statement, explicitly using the term ‘economic freedom’, easier than a more abstract 
paraphrase of the concept. This might be due to the negative associations the notion evokes in 
some degrowth supporters. Rejecting a concept they can clearly associate with a worldview 
opposing their own (e.g., neoliberal market fundamentalism) is clearly easier than recognising 
the same concept left implicit in a statement. We might then speculate that the apparent 
dependence of judgements on the wording of a particular sentence is likely to be linked to an 
emotional rejection of some key words, rather than a sound personal understanding of what it 
means to be free for themselves. 
Combined, the above evidence indicates an under-conceptualisation of freedom, reflected 
in the incomplete and sometimes inconsistent interpretation of freedom and its central 
constituents. While there is no single causal explanation, the lack of conceptual clarity is 
aided by the absence of thematic discussion and debate concerning freedom in the degrowth 
discourse. In order to rectify this situation, the degrowth movement would need to explicitly 
address the meaning and role of freedom in a future degrowth society, and make more explicit 
an alternative vision of freedom that is compatible with conscious, voluntary self-limitation 
placed within an economic and social provisioning system outside of market choice. This 
could pave the way for both a theoretical clarification and the internalisation of a new 
framework to make sense of freedom in the context of a social-ecological transformation. 
5. Conclusion 
Degrowth as a social movement, with links to the works of Castoriadis, has an implicit 
conceptualisation of freedom. We have sought to make this explicit and then test for the gap 
between degrowth and neoliberal theories of freedom, combining a conceptual analysis of the 
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two with an exploratory empirical study employing original survey design. We found that the 
prevalent understanding of freedom amongst those who participated in the 2018 Degrowth 
Conference is largely in line with Castoriadis’ notion of freedom and autonomy. Neoliberal 
positions and arguments were firmly rejected by the majority of respondents. For this 
majority, freedom clearly goes beyond the narrow negative definition, as absence of external 
coercion, and the sole focus on markets implied by the neoliberal theory. Instead, they 
embrace a positive, more substantive interpretation of freedom that encompasses the 
awareness of and engagement with external and internal constraints, while also emphasising 
the importance of reflective and creative acts of self-determination, both in the individual and 
collective dimension. 
However, the empirical study also revealed an under-conceptualisation of freedom, 
which can be explained in part by the neglect the topic has so far experienced in the degrowth 
discourse. The nature and role of freedom in a future, socially and ecologically sustainable 
and equitable society takes on added significance when considering concrete actions. In a 
movement devoted to social ecological transformation, the inability to identify core 
conceptual aspects of freedom, when they are implicit, is worrisome. Individuals appear 
confused as to their core values and may face unarticulated value conflicts. This is hardly 
surprising due to the dominance of the hegemonic structure in pushing a neoliberal 
interpretation of freedom. However, this also implies that alternative conceptualisations of 
freedom require far better articulation than so far appears to have taken place. 
The results presented here are only an initial exploration, but the study raises some 
important issues concerning the extent to which theory and practice are being united in the 
political project of degrowth. Degrowth conference participants are likely to be structurally 
caught in a mode of living that is part of the hegemonic neoliberal political economy. In 
communities and amongst groups whose daily practices are aimed at implementing an 
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alternative mode of living we would expect strong adoption of transformative agendas 
including the degrowth conception of freedom. At present, this is likely to apply only to a 
minority of degrowth conference participants. This raises the importance of the role that 
different institutions play in empowering and preventing a substantively different common 
conceptualisation of what it means to be free. 
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Appendix 1: Ten Scenarios Relating to Constraints on Personal Freedom (CPF) 






1 N1 There is a referendum in my town. The outcome is the opposite of what I 
voted for. I have to bow to the majority vote. 
2 D1 My boss asks me to work extra hours all the time. I cannot afford to lose 
the job, so I never say no. 
3 D2 All my life I’ve dreamed of learning how to dance. I would love to enrol 
for dance classes, but I can’t afford them. 
4 N2 Where I live, the economy is entirely organised through markets. There is 
no other way for me to satisfy my needs. 
5 D3 After reading about the environmental consequences of flying, I decided 
not to travel by plane anymore. Now it’s nearly impossible for me to visit 
some good friends who live abroad. 
6 N3 I need new shoes. There is only one shoemaker in town who sells only one 
model. I have no choice but to buy these ones. 
7 D4 My parents always wanted me to be a doctor. Now I’m trying really hard 
to become one. I’ve never questioned if that is what I really want. 
8 N4 I don’t want to pay taxes, but I have to, otherwise I’ll get punished. 
9 D5 I live in a society where I am protected by an exhaustive list of rights and 
liberties. However, I have no possibility to participate in political decision 
processes. 
10 D6 Nowadays, everything is being produced industrially. I have no idea how 
to amend or repair stuff I bought. I am fully dependent on experts. 
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Appendix 2: Thirteen Conceptual Statements on Freedom (CSF) 





Full Item Statement 
1 N1 An unequal distribution of freedom is justified, as long as the overall society 
benefits in the long run. 
2 N2 Without the right to possess private property, it is impossible for me to be 
free. 
3 D1 Freedom implies the chance to go beyond all options available to me and 
come up with something completely new. 
4 N3 The market mechanism creates a spontaneous order which is more 
beneficial to society than an allocation of resources based on human 
planning. 
5 D2 Self-limitation is a deliberate choice, and thus an expression of freedom. 
6 N4 Redistributional policies infringe on someone’s individual freedom and 
should hence be rejected. 
7 D3 I cannot be considered free, if I don’t have a say in the making of the 
societal rules and principles which determine the scope of my actions. 
8 D4 Collectively owning and managing property favours a democratisation of 
production processes, leading to a more free society. 
9 D5 In a free society, every societal norm, rule and principle must be open to 
challenge, collective reconsideration and reconfiguration. 
10 N5 Economic freedom is essential, because it makes markets work properly. 
11 D6 In a degrowth society, being free primarily means to be autonomous (i.e. 
self-governing). 
12 N6 An economic system that guarantees that no one is being forced into 
transactions is more essential to a free society than political rights. 
13 D7 Freedom implies a continuous struggle, rather than a state achieved once 
and for all. 
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Appendix 3: Single Most Essential Condition for Personal Freedom 
‘Among the following options, what is the most essential condition for you to be free?’ 
Options Theoretical concept N % 
Forming and endorsing my beliefs and 
desires deliberately, not blindly 
Deliberate will-formation 37 26 
Not being subject to the arbitrary power of 
others (even if their power is not exercised) 
Freedom as independence 30 21 
Being in control (i.e. being the author) of my 
own life 
Autonomy 29 20 
Not being coerced to do something I don’t 
want to do 
Negative liberty 22 15 
Having the effective possibility to realise my 
life goals 
Positive liberty 19 13 
Being able to go beyond all pre-defined 
alternatives and invent something new for 
myself 
Self-emancipation 7 5 
Total  144 100 
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Appendix 4: Other Preconditions necessary for Personal Freedom 
‘What other preconditions are necessary for you to be free?’ 
Categories Frequencies 
Free, equal access to education & knowledge 26 
Being able to satisfy basic human needs 19 
Acceptance, support and self-efficacy in social relationships & community 11 
Equal distribution of and respect for other people’s freedom 6 
No discrimination & equality of gender and race 6 
Being able to live in a sustainable/healthy environment 6 
Free mobility 6 
Safety & legal system 6 
Critical thinking & self-reflection 5 
Equal opportunities to realise capabilities 5 
Freedom of expression 4 
Privacy, leisure time, arts 4 
No exploitation of other beings, no violence or coercion 3 
No oppressive social norms 3 
Equal access to resources 2 
Universal Basic Income 2 
Overcoming ideological domination (capitalism, colonialism) 2 
Other (single mentions) 4 
Total 120 
Note: Total items mentioned by 102 participants. 

